



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

~~Top Secret~~

25X1

OCPAS/CIG

CY# 281

National Intelligence Daily

*Monday
18 April 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-091JX

18 April 1983

Copy 281

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret



25X1


Contents

Western Europe: Divisions on CSCE Policy 1



25X1

Guatemala: Political Parties More Active 3



25X1

China: Defense Minister Blocks Arms Imports 8


Bolivia: Narcotics Control Efforts 8

Special Analysis

El Salvador: Status of the Conflict 9

25X1

Top Secret



25X1

18 April 1983



Top Secret

25X1

WESTERN EUROPE: Divisions on CSCE Policy

The Allies remain divided over how to approach the human rights issue when the CSCE Review Conference resumes in Madrid this week. [redacted]

25X1

West German Foreign Minister Genscher has been the leading proponent of making only minor changes in the human rights provisions of a compromise final document submitted by the neutral participants. Genscher and other Foreign Office officials believe an agreement at Madrid, including a decision to convene a European Disarmament Conference later this year, would improve public acceptance of INF missile deployments. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Greece and Denmark are closest to West Germany's position. Despite West German Foreign Ministry claims of West European unity on CSCE, the UK, the Netherlands, and probably Belgium continue to share the US view that the human rights provisions of the neutrals' draft require major changes. [redacted]

25X1

Comment: Although the West Germans and others may continue to urge the US to be more flexible on human rights, EC members will find it difficult to maintain unity among themselves on this issue as the conference progresses. All the Allies believe the USSR will resist Western demands in the human rights area, and some speculate the Soviets would be content to let the meeting fail if the blame could be put on the West. Should a deadlock occur, the Allies probably would settle for a final document that would merely establish the time and place for the next meeting in order to keep the CSCE process alive. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

25X1

18 April 1983

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret

25X1

GUATEMALA: Political Parties More Active

Political leaders are moving rapidly to meet new legal requirements for official registration of their parties, but President Rios Montt does not plan to call for a national election soon. []

25X1

Government officials privately indicate the earliest date for a constituent assembly election will be in the middle of next year. Rios Montt believes the voter lists are fraudulent, and he opposes holding the election until they are replaced. Insurgents have destroyed registration data in many localities. []

25X1

Most of the existing parties have established executive committees and are creating new local organizations, but they will be unable to register the required 4,000 supporters until the government completes the new lists. The small number of supporters required to form a political party is causing established parties to divide into factions and has prompted the formation of several new organizations. One politician reports as many as 30 groups may try to set up parties. []

25X1

The government is reiterating that all groups, including the Communists, can participate in the political process. It also is emphasizing that no "official" party will compete as in past years.

25X1

Comment: Rios Montt probably intends to serve a full four-year term in order to have time to reform the political system and expand political participation. He apparently wants to weaken the existing parties—which he says are not representative enough—by encouraging a diffusion of political support among more parties and by prolonging the election timetable. The rightwing National Liberation Movement, which would benefit from early elections, is the only major party thus far to protest the extended timetable. []

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Page Denied

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

CHINA: Defense Minister Blocks Arms Imports

Western officials in Beijing report Defense Minister Zhang has angered Navy and Air Force leaders by blocking purchases of British air defense missiles and French fighter aircraft. Zhang, reportedly with the support of Premier Zhao, refused to ratify a contract signed by the Navy last fall for British Sea Dart missiles, and he played a key role in killing Air Force talks with the French on the acquisition of Mirage 2000 fighters. [redacted] Zhang is under pressure from both the Navy and Air Force to step down.

[redacted]

25X1

25X1

Comment: Zhang's stance on arms imports is in line with his recent article in the party's theoretical journal on defense modernization, in which he called the wholesale importation of weapons "unrealistic" and stressed self-reliance. China's recent success in selling arms to the Third World has resulted in large profits for its defense industries, and the services may have hoped to use that money to import weapon systems. Reports of hostility toward Zhang probably are exaggerated, however, and it is unlikely that opposition to him has reached the point of open calls for his ouster.

[redacted]

25X1

BOLIVIA: Narcotics Control Efforts

President Siles recently promised to wage a campaign against increasing coca cultivation, drug trafficking, and related corruption. As part of this effort Siles has formed a national committee to formulate, coordinate, and execute government narcotics policies. The committee, which will be headed by a representative from the Office of the President, will include members from the six principal ministries currently involved in narcotics control and enforcement. It was established in response to continuing US pressure for more action on narcotics control, which the US has linked to increased economic assistance. [redacted]

25X1

Comment: The government's financial problems probably will not enable it to provide the committee with adequate resources. Moreover, Siles is unlikely to risk a threat to his fragile coalition by challenging the country's powerful narcotics interests. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret
[redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Insurgent Areas



25X1

Top Secret

18 April 1983

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Special Analysis

EL SALVADOR: Status of the Conflict

The war in El Salvador continues to be a standoff, but recent gains by the guerrillas in the north and east, their more adept propaganda apparatus, and the intense political infighting in the armed forces may be giving the insurgents a psychological advantage. Fighting probably will increase in the next several weeks as the guerrillas pursue their strategy of obtaining a military edge before the elections in December. The Army will be hard pressed to defend key economic targets and prevent the insurgents from gaining the initiative. []

25X1

The insurgents have not gained a significant military advantage, despite their use of more aggressive tactics since last October. Nevertheless, they have forced the Army to concede control of the northern half of Chalatenango and Morazan Departments. They also have continued to hit economic targets, isolate government outposts, attack small garrisons, and ambush relief columns. []

25X1

Government Forces

The Salvadoran military continues to rely heavily on periodic large-scale sweeps against guerrilla strongholds to keep the insurgents off balance. These operations, which have had some success in central El Salvador, are usually planned and carried out by the local departmental commanders with little support from the General Staff. One or more of the three US-trained immediate reaction battalions and two smaller Venezuelan-trained "hunter" battalions are used in nearly every major operation. []

25X1

The Army is forming a fourth immediate reaction battalion to be trained by the US. It also plans to field 12 new "hunter" battalions by the end of 1983—without Venezuelan training—so that each of the generally defense-oriented departmental commands will have its own quick reaction capability. The Army can obtain enough manpower through conscription to fill these units, but providing enough officers and senior noncommissioned officers to lead them will present major problems. []

25X1

Poor leadership remains one of the Army's greatest weaknesses. Many officers lack the experience and personal initiative needed to conduct successful small-unit operations. Inadequately trained and motivated troops at many departmental garrisons often are vulnerable to the hit-and-run tactics of seasoned insurgents fighting in familiar terrain. []

25X1

*continued***Top Secret**

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

The Insurgents

The insurgents' chief handicap probably is their divided command structure. Although there is a general insurgent command in Managua, each of the five guerrilla factions maintains its own headquarters and a parallel communications and supply networks in El Salvador. This makes tactical coordination among the groups difficult and limits their ability to take on large government units. [REDACTED]

25X1

In addition, the guerrillas lack an effective means of air defense. They have suffered high casualties on those occasions when government units have been able to coordinate their air support. [REDACTED]

25X1

The insurgents also have found it difficult to stand against the US-trained battalions. Moreover, they still lack substantial popular support in either the cities or the countryside—except in areas where they have long been in control. [REDACTED]

25X1

The guerrillas are beginning a new military offensive to try to shift the military balance in their favor before the elections in December. They plan major operations next month, provided they achieve greater coordination among the various factions. To weaken the Army's morale, they reportedly plan to make its elite units special targets. [REDACTED]

25X1

Outlook

The insurgents' planned offensive is likely to keep the pressure on government forces, especially if the guerrillas can keep most units tied down trying to defend important economic targets. The guerrillas, however, will have considerable difficulty in eliminating the elite battalions. Unless these units fall carelessly into ambushes in insurgent territory, the guerrillas lack the firepower to overwhelm them. [REDACTED]

25X1

Nevertheless, the leftists' efficient propaganda apparatus probably will take maximum advantage of any guerrilla victories to weaken the government's image. In addition, the armed forces will have to take in stride any repercussions from the reported resignation of Defense Minister Garcia to prevent the guerrillas from seizing and holding the military initiative over the next several months. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret

25X1

Top Secret